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Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. 
This meta study summarizes the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix 
parameters they did not intend to test, in multiple regression the meta study is able to assess the 
effect of single manipulations, controlling for a host of alternative explanatory factors. The re-
sulting rich dataset also provides a testbed for comparing alternative specifications of the statisti-
cal model for analysing dictator game data. It shows how Tobit models (assuming that dictators 
would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a posi-
tive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) provide additional in-
sights. 
JEL: C24, C91, D03 
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1. Introduction 
Some 25 years ago, Daniel Kahneman first had students in his classroom play an ultimatum 
game (Güth, Schmittberger et al. 1982), which was then followed by the question: 
“You will be matched at random with two other students, and you will get to share 
some money with one or both of them. If the two people made different decisions 
in the first stage (e.g. one of them took $10 and one took $18), then you must 
make a decision about how to allocate the money. Call the person who took $10 
and gave the other one $10 student E (for even). Call the person who took $18 and 
gave the other one $2 student U (for uneven). Your choices are as follows: you 
may allocate $5 to yourself, $5 to student E, and nothing to student U; or you may 
allocate $6 to yourself, nothing to student E, and $6 to student U”.  
74 % of their participants chose the first option although this cost them $1 (Kahneman, 
Knetsch et al. 1986:S290 f.). This is how a literature started to which in the meantime 129 
contributions have been published, testing a total of 616 different treatments.
1 The experi-
mental paradigm has proven so powerful precisely because it is so simple. Actually the suc-
cessors of Kahneman have further simplified the game (starting with Forsythe, Horowitz et al. 
1994). The game now is typically stripped of the third party punishment component and 
played in isolation. The dictator's action space is complete, so that she may distribute the pie 
at her will between the recipient and herself. 
Kahneman invented the game as part of his programme that turned textbook assumptions into 
behavioural hypotheses. While normally a sizeable fraction of participants does indeed give 
nothing, as predicted by the payoff maximisation hypothesis, only very rarely this has been 
the majority choice. It by now is undisputed that human populations are systematically more 
benevolent than homo oeconomicus. Later experiments have explored this predisposition in 
two dimensions: situational and demographic. The former implicitly sticks to the claim that, at 
least at the population level, behavioural dispositions are human universals. It engages in re-
fining the conditions under which benevolence is to be expected. The latter puts the research 
question upside down and uses the extremely simple design as a tool for quantifying system-
atic behavioural differences between populations. 
The dictator game has become popular among experimentalists. In the one year of 2008, 30 
new papers with this game have been published. It therefore is time to take stock, and to make 
the existing body of evidence accessible. Yet this paper aims beyond merely providing orien-
tation. Implicitly, through their design choices, experimenters have generated data on inde-
pendent variables they have not explicitly set out to test. They for instance have played a one-
shot game with students, asking dictators to divide a pie of $10 given to them between them-
selves and an anonymous recipient from the same subject pool. What looks like a perfectly 
standard dictator game implicitly provides data on one shot versus repeated games; on games 
with students versus other populations; on manna from heaven versus earned money; on 
stakes; on a specified degree of social distance; on dictator-recipient anonymity versus dicta-
                                        
1   For detail, see the list of papers used for the meta study in Appendix 1.   3
tor identification. This evidence is untapped as yet. It is useful for two purposes. The basis for 
testing the effect of isolated manipulations becomes much broader. More interestingly even, it 
becomes possible to control for alternative explanations to a degree that by far transcends 
what is feasible in individual experimental studies. That way one learns which effects are ro-
bust, and how big effects are once one controls for other factors that have been shown to mat-
ter for the willingness of dictators to give. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains how the sample has 
been collected and addresses analytic methodology. Section 3 treats all experiments as contri-
butions to one question: how much are dictators willing to give? Section 4 focuses on individ-
ual experimental manipulations. Section 5 simultaneously uses all these independent variables 
to explain generosity with multiple regressions. In this section I also discuss different options 
for specifying the statistical model. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data and Methodology 
In disciplines like medicine or psychology, meta-analysis is standard.
2 In econometrics it is 
also becoming increasingly frequent.
3 By contrast, the number of meta studies on economic 
experiments is still fairly limited (Druckman 1994; Harless and Camerer 1994; Croson and 
Marks 2000; Zelmer 2003; Huck, Normann et al. 2004; Oosterbeek, Sloof et al. 2004; Black-
well 2007; Engel 2007; Prante, Thacher et al. 2007; Jones 2008; Hopfensitz 2009; Percoco 
and Nijkamp 2009; Weizsäcker 2010). A word on the potential and the limitations of the 
method may therefore be in order.  
Meta-analysis is best understood as quantitative literature review (Stanley 2001). It is much 
more objective, and usually also more informative, than narrative review. It exploits the fact 
that there is a whole body of studies that are sufficiently similar to make their joint analysis 
meaningful; with lab experiments, this condition is much easier to fulfil than with field data, 
given they are standardised by design (Thompson and Pocock 1991). Nonetheless, different 
experiments have related, but different research questions. They may be differently well exe-
cuted. Non-results are difficult to publish, which may lead to publication bias. Heterogeneity 
between studies can be pronounced, which may be due to unobserved explanatory factors (all 
of this had already been discussed by Druckman 1994). These concerns can be mitigated by 
the techniques presented in this section. Still results from meta analysis should be read with 
caution. If a researcher remains sceptical about a finding from meta-analysis, she should de-
sign a new experiment that is specifically targeted to precisely this research question. 
Two papers have engaged in a similar exercise. In 2003, Camerer has done a meta-study of 11 
experiments (Camerer 2003:57 f.). In 2008 Cardenas and Carpenter have done the same for 
                                        
2   The database PsychInfo reports 4,685 entries with the word „meta analysis” in the title of the paper. 
3   The database EconLit reports 491 entries with the keyword „meta analysis”, most of which refer to work 
in econometrics.   4
10 experiments playing the dictator game in developing countries (Cárdenas and Carpenter 
2008:317). The present meta-study covers all 129 papers published between 1992 and the end 
of 2009, including 4 papers to come out in 2010 but already available through advance access. 
4 papers do not report sample size. The remaining papers cover a total of 41,433 observations. 
The search for papers has started with the two predecessor studies. The keyword “dictator 
game” produced 89 hits in the EconLit database, and 240 hits in RePEc. Finally I have 
checked the references of the papers thus found. Unsurprisingly, these sources frequently 
pointed to the same publications. Moreover, in particular but not only in RePEc, not so rarely 
one and the same publication is listed repeatedly within the same database, usually since ear-
lier and later versions are kept. Subtracting duplicates, the resulting gross sample includes 255 
papers. I have excluded 76 papers since they test a different game. I in particular have left 
aside papers that give the recipient any kind of power (and thereby bring the experiment close 
to an ultimatum game); papers (like (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986) that started the litera-
ture) that mix the motive of benevolence with one of sanctioning the recipient; twelve papers 
that limit the dictator's action space such that it does not include the option to give nothing 
(again like (Kahneman, Knetsch et al. 1986)). Six experiments play the right game, but ask a 
different research question. They for instance want to know how much unendowed observers 
expect dictators to give (Aguiar, Branas-Garza et al. 2009). Another 15 papers do not report 
the data such that it can be used for meta-analysis. Seven papers have no original data. Anoth-
er five are surveys or (the two) meta-studies. 20 are pure theory papers. One is a pure econo-
metrics paper. The papers included in the final sample comprise a total of 616 treatments. I 
deliberately include working papers, even if they have never been published, to guard against 
publication bias (as recommended by Thompson and Pocock 1991). 
In dictator games, the dependent variable is (quasi)continuous. Dictators may give any frac-
tion between 0 and 100 % of their endowments, albeit frequently only in integers of $10. 
Classic meta-analysis works with one datapoint per experiment and condition. In my case, this 
is the mean fraction of the pie that dictators give recipients. For 498 treatments, this measure 
has been reported. For the remaining treatments, it can be calculated from the pie size and 
information on individual contributions.  
While all experiments reported in this paper play a dictator game, they use this game to test a 
rich array of research questions. To do so, they manipulate a host of context factors. Given 
manipulations differ, one should expect differences in outcome. More importantly, heteroge-
neity across studies can be traced back to explicit differences in experimental design, includ-
ing factors held constant in the individual experiment, but different across experiments. The 
appropriate technique for capturing this observed heterogeneity is meta regression (Harbord 
and Higgins 2008).   5
Meta-analysis exploits the fact that individual studies have different size and different vari-
ance.
4 So called fixed effects meta-regression weights each data point by the respective stand-
ard error.
5 The weight thus reflects the precision of the information from each study. Yet in 
my sample standard deviations or standard errors are only reported for 191 treatments. Fortu-
nately, for another 254 treatments, the standard error can be reconstructed from information 
on the distribution of give rates. Frequently, this information is presented graphically, as a 
histogram or as a cumulative distribution, with no exact numbers reported. I then have 
checked whether my measurement of the height of bars is sufficiently precise. I have accepted 
the outcome if numbers add up to a result within [.95 1.05]. I thus have accepted a translation 
mistake of at most 5%. This procedure seemed more reliable than ex post readjusting the vis-
ual impression such that the numbers add up to exactly 1. 
Fixed effects meta-analysis assumes that all studies are taken from a sample with the same 
residual error. So called random effects meta-analysis relaxes this assumption. It takes the 
possibility into account that different experiments not only differ by observed design features, 
but also by unobserved factors. Following the procedure proposed by (DerSimonian and Laird 
1986), random effects meta-regression allows the standard error of each study to itself result 
from a random draw. It thus works with model 
i i e u y     ' i x  
where  i y  is the fraction of the pie one participant gives the recipient,   ' i x  is a vector of ex-
planatory variables with its coefficient vector,  ) , 0 ( ~
2  N u  is the between studies error, with 
variance 
2  , and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
i i N e   is the within study (residual) error. Consequently, each study is 
weighted with   
2 2 / 1    i  (Harbord and Higgins 2008). The weight thus also reflects how 
much the respective treatment contributes to explaining the between studies variance.
6 This 
procedure mitigates the loss in information resulting from unobserved heterogeneity across 
studies. 
Normally, meta-analysis cannot go any further. Fortunately, the literature on dictator games 
frequently not only reports means and standard errors, but also distributions. The measure is 
slightly imprecise though. Even if dictators’ action space was not limited to integers from 0 to 
10, usually only deciles are reported. Moreover, I mostly had to translate graphs into numbers 
for the purpose, with a small risk of translation error. With these limitations, based on distri-
bution information and on the N of the respective study, for those 83 papers with complete 
distribution information, I am able to reconstruct the original data, resulting in 20,813 obser-
vations.
7 The procedure to do so is straightforward. If a publication reports 100 observations 
                                        
4   While this is standard in the neighbouring disciplines, weighting by a measure for precision is still unusu-
al in experimental economics, but see (Croson and Marks 2000; Zelmer 2003) who weight by the number 
of observations. 
5   Terminology slightly differs from the terminology that is standard in econometrics. The „fixed effects” 
model actually does not have an individual specific effect in the model, but exclusively captures differ-
ences between studies by the weight. 
6   For the restricted maximum likelihood estimator of 
2  , see (Harbord and Higgins 2008). 
7   (Prante, Thacher et al. 2007; Hopfensitz 2009; Weizsäcker 2010) also work with meta datasets.   6
per treatment, and if in the first treatment 30% have kept their entire endowment, this results 
in 30 reconstructed datapoints with the independent variables from this treatment and 0% giv-
ing as the normalized dependent variable. Note that I have full information of independent 
variables in that they are fix per treatment.  
I use this second data set for complementary analysis. It in particular makes it possible to go 
beyond means per treatment as the exclusive dependent variable, and to also investigate dis-
tributions. If I work with this data set, I have to account for the fact that each study has gener-
ated multiple data points. I use two complementary approaches. Clustering at the level of 
treatments corrects standard errors for the potential lack of independence. Treatment dummies 
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
8 Along with the analysis based on individual data, clas-
sical meta-analysis is always reported since it is more conservative, and since it can cover 
more papers. 
The reconstructed meta-dataset provides a further opportunity. As is patent from the graphs 
usually reported in dictator game manuscripts, giving is not distributed normally. A substan-
tial fraction tends to give nothing. Frequently there is a second peak at the equal split. The 
rich dataset that reflects characteristic distributions makes it possible to discuss alternative 
statistical approaches for analysing this data. 
3. Overall  generosity 
If one calculates the grand mean from all reported or constructed means per 616 treatments, 
dictators on average give 28.35 % of the pie. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the distribution of 
means is left skewed. Dictators are more likely to give little. In 6 of 616 treatments, they on 




                                        
8   This approach has also been used by (Croson and Marks 2000; Hopfensitz 2009). 
9   In (Brosig, Riechmann et al. 2007) giving nothing established the equal split between both players’ en-
dowments; in the pertinent treatment of (Leider, Möbius et al. 2009) social distance was high and effi-
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Distribution of Mean Giving per Treatment 
 
Technically, meta-analysis is more reliable since it weights observations by their precision. It 
can be undertaken for those 445 treatments for which standard errors are reported or can be 
reconstructed. Interestingly, random effects meta-analysis almost perfectly matches the un-
weighted grand mean. It establishes a give rate of 28.3 %.
10 In principle, this is a very reliable 
result. The null hypothesis that the give rate is 0 is rejected with z = 35.44, p <.0001. Yet be-
tween studies heterogeneity is pronounced. Between studies variance
11 explains 97.1 % of the 
overall variance. Since we have information on a host of independent variables, this is a 
strong indicator that meta-regression is preferable over mere meta-analysis. 
Finally, using the supplementary dataset with reconstructed individual observations, we learn 
that contributions are very unevenly distributed over the unit interval, see Figure 2. 36.11 % 
of all participants give nothing to the recipient. 16.74 % choose the equal split. As many as 
5.44 % give the recipient everything. 
 
                                        
10   The result from fixed-effects meta-analysis differs though. If weights are not corrected for the contribu-
tion of a treatment to explaining between studies variance, the estimated give rate goes down to 20.4 %. 
11   In technical terms, parameter 
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Distribution of Individual Give Rates 
 
4. Explanatory  Factors 
Experiments are designed to test the effect of one, maybe two or three, manipulations. In the 
motivation of their papers, experimentalists link their tests to the related literature. Yet if ex-
periments are not meant to test formal theory, which is normally not the case in dictator 
games, it is not always clear how one effect is related to another. In a fully satisfactory way, 
these links could only be built if the mediating factors, from the environment or from partici-
pants’ attitudes, were isolated; this would require new experiments. Here, I must content my-
self with ex post generating order in this literature. In so doing, I start with those manipula-
tions that are closest to standard economic theory. A number of experiments have slightly 
altered the incentive structure (a). Others have given the dictator all the power, but have ex-
posed her to social control. This tests the power of social expectations and of the risk of social 
sanctions (b). Money maximising agents only care about their own payoff. Many experi-
mental games point to the fact that participants are also sensitive to relative, not only to abso-
lute payoffs. Many dictator games have explored the motivating force of payoff comparisons 
by making the dictator and the recipient differently deserving (c). Some experiments have 
introduced context by framing the situation. Since context defies standardisation, for this me-
ta-study only one manipulation is analysed in detail: the effect of having participants handle 
real coins or notes (d). I may be willing to give to the victims of an earthquake at the opposite 
side of the globe, and my neighbours may have annoyed me so much in the past that they 
would be the least to whom I would want to be generous. Yet if such contextual factors are 
excluded by design, one would expect that people give the less, the higher the social distance 
between themselves and the recipient (e). Finally, demographics like age, gender, race, or the 
country of origin matter (f). Many of these explanatory variables are dummies, some are ordi-
nally scaled, some are continuous. For detail, the reader is referred to the descriptive statistics 
in Appendix 2.   9
As is typical for meta-studies, these independent variables are not distributed equally across 
the (meta) sample. Moreover some independent variables are not reported in all studies. For 
detail, the interested reader is again referred to Appendix 2. Since the dataset is rich, despite 
the imbalance many effects turn out significant. In this section, I introduce the independent 
variables one by one and present tests. Even if effects are significant, once one controls for 
study heterogeneity, the additional explanatory power due to a single explanatory variable is 
usually fairly low. I nonetheless report regressions throughout. Knowing the marginal effect 
and its significance level is more informative than just descriptive statistics, which would be 
the alternative. Also, low explanatory power is what one should expect. All models aim at 
explaining variance in giving in the entire dataset. Yet the variance of individual explanatory 
factors across studies is low for most individual explanatory factors. As laid out in Appendix 
2, most individual explanatory factors are distributed very unevenly in this dataset. Therefore 
frequently a small number of datapoints have to provide all the explanation. In Section 5, 
models are presented that simultaneously control for multiple explanatory factors. They ex-
plain a much higher fraction of the variance.  
a) Incentives 
In most dictator games, the action space is quasi continuous. For instance the stake is $10, and 
dictators can give any amount of integer dollars they deem fit, but they usually cannot split 
the amount by cents. Sometimes, experimenters have (further) constrained the action space. 
They for instance have excluded the equal split, or they have only given dictators a choice 
between keeping everything and contributing half of the pie (both is, e.g. used in Bolton, Ka-
tok et al. 1998). Meta-regression with this explanatory variable is insignificant. However if 
one uses individual data, limiting the action space has a significant positive effect: OLS, with 
fixed effects for each treatment (not reported), cons .342***, limited action space .121***, N 
= 20,813, additional adj.R
2 <.001.
12 
In the standard dictator game, the dictator may be sure that her decision determines her pay-
off. Some papers have introduced uncertainty about the dictator's own payoff. A lottery de-
termines whether the dictator's choice is implemented, or whether it is replaced by a random 
draw (a key contribution is Andreoni and Bernheim 2009). Again meta-regression is insignifi-
cant. However using individual data, one establishes a significant negative effect. The less the 
dictator is sure that intended benevolence becomes effective, the less she gives in the first 
place: OLS, cons .342***, degree of uncertainty -.265***, N = 20,813, additional adj.R
2 
<.001. 
                                        
12   All OLS models have heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Throughout the paper, significance levels 
are reported by *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, 
+ p < .1. Since the model contains a regressor for each 
treatment of an experiment, the overall adjusted R
2 (which is .230) is not informative. Instead the increase 
in the adjusted R
2 resulting from adding the regressor(s) in question is reported. In the concrete instance it 
is close to 0, despite the fact that the regressor is highly significant, t = 4.59, p < .001.   10
Normally, there is just one dictator. What if more than one dictator competes? The key contri-
bution to this question is a study with school children. After the whole class had played, the 
payoff ranking was posted on the blackboard, and the dictator with the highest payoff got an 
additional treat (Houser and Schunk 2009). Once more, meta-regression is insignificant, as is 
a regression with individual data.
13  
It is standard in dictator games to pay out each individual choice. Yet if experimenters have 
repeated the game, or if they wanted to use high stakes, they sometimes have only paid some 
choices, or some dictators for that matter, at random. Occasionally, experimenters have not 
used pecuniary incentives at all, and have just asked the hypothetical question how much par-
ticipants would be happy to give, were they to have the money. Again, the effect of this ma-
nipulation is insignificant in meta-regression and when using individual data.
14  
The standard stakes in a dictator game are $10. Especially when repeating the game, or when 
using the strategy method (Selten 1967), stakes can be fairly low. An additional challenge 
stems from the fact that many experiments have been run in countries with a national currency 
other than the dollar. If papers have indicated the exchange rate at the time of the experiment, 
I have used the dollar equivalent. Nonetheless, for this independent variable, I only have 440 
(rather than 616) treatments. Stakes range from $0 to $130, with mean $21.77. This time, both 
meta-regression and a regression with the original data are insignificant. Meta-regression is 
significant, though, if one reduces the sample to those 158 treatments that have manipulated 
stakes. Higher stakes reduce the willingness to give. If there is more to gain, dictators keep 
more, not only in absolute, but also in relative terms (although the effect is very small): meta-
regression, cons .326***, stake -.002**, N = 158, adj.R
2 .036. 
The standard dictator game is one shot. Some experimenters have repeated the game, but 
changed recipients every round. Others have used the strategy method. I have coded both ma-
nipulations as multiple tests. Multiple tests have a clear negative effect on giving: meta-
regression, cons .297***, multiple tests -.071**, N = 445, adj.R
2 .058.  
What if the dictator is not an individual, but a group?  Again, both meta-regression and re-
gression with individual data are insignificant.
15  
 
                                        
13   If one does not add study dummies (but clusters standard errors for treatments), dictators give less if they 
are under competitive pressure, OLS, cons .273***, dictator competition -.074*, N = 20,813, adj.R
2 
.0008. 
14   If one does not add study dummies (but clusters standard errors for treatments), one finds a significant 
negative effect for random pay, while hypothetical payment is still not significantly different from paying 
out every choice, OLS, cons .377***, random pay -.117***, hypothetical pay -.045, N = 20,813, adj.R
2 
.010. 
15   There is a highly significant effect when using individual data and not adding treatment dummies (but 
clustering standard errors at the treatment level). Groups then are more selfish than individuals: OLS, 
cons .274***, group decision -.083***, N = 20,813, adj.R
2 .002.   11
b) Social  Control 
Many experimenters have wondered whether dictator greed would disappear with increased 
social control. The most obvious way to increase social control is making recipients identify 
the person in whose hands they are. One for instance makes dictators stand up, so that recipi-
ents observe who decides (Frey and Bohnet 1995). Here, meta-regression yields a surprising 
result. The effect of identification is insignificant. But it becomes significant if one controls 
for stakes. Yet then the effect is negative: meta-regression, cons .283***, identification -
.060*, stake .0002, N = 346, adj.R
2 .045. At the level of individual data, the effect reverses 
and thus is strongly positive, as one would expect: OLS, cons .342***, identification .658*, N 
= 20,813, additional adj.R
2 <.001. Comparing distributions, one sees the likely reason for the 
surprising result of meta-regression, Figure 3. If dictators are identified, this has three effects: 
they are less likely to give nothing; the mode shifts from 0 to .5; dictators are less likely to 





















Effect of Dictator Identification 
based on individual data 
 
A less intrusive form of increasing social control is giving the dictator a social cue. For in-
stance one study has shown part of the dictators three large dots that were arranged in a way 
that evokes a face (Rigdon, Ishii et al. 2009). Since standard dictator games are devoid of any 
social cues, it is meaningful to compare them. While the effect is not significant in meta-
regression, it is when using individual data (and controlling for study heterogeneity), OLS, 
cons .342***, social cue .121***, N = 20,813, additional adj. R
2 <.001. 
Other experimenters have not increased, but reduced the degree of social control, compared to 
the standard design of dictator games. To that end, they have given the dictator a chance to 
hide her decision, such that the recipient does not learn (for sure) that her payoff is due to a   12
dictator's decision (see e.g. Dana, Cain et al. 2006). This reduces dictators’ generosity: meta-
regression, cons .288***, concealment option -.077*, N = 445, adj.R
2 .007. 
Early on, experimenters were concerned that dictator-recipient anonymity would be insuffi-
cient to measure true benevolence. They were afraid that participants would give because they 
were aware the experimenter would learn their choices. Fairly elaborate procedures have been 
invented to also guarantee dictator-experimenter anonymity (starting with Hoffman, McCabe 
et al. 1994). Both in meta-regression and when using individual data, such doubleblind proto-
cols do not have a significant effect. This changes if one controls for one shot versus repeated 
interaction. One then finds a weakly significant, small reduction of generosity: meta-
regression, cons .309***, repeated interaction -.082***, doubleblind -.036
+, N = 445, adj.R
2 
.066. This suggests that the choice between single and double blind designs matters only in 
more complicated designs. 
c) Distributive  Concerns 
Ultimately, a dictator game is about distribution. One should therefore expect that dictators 
give more if the recipient’s claim to her fair share is made more legitimate. One way of ma-
nipulating legitimacy is property rights. In the standard dictator game, the dictator receives 
money from the experimenter and is free to give a fraction to the recipient. What if, instead, 
the money is allocated to the recipient, but the dictator is free to take a fraction (as first inves-
tigated by Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee 1998)? While this does not have a significant 
effect in meta-regression, it does when using individual data, and controlling for study hetero-
geneity, cons .342***, take option -.342***, additional adj.R
2 <.001. The constant and the 
regressor almost perfectly neutralize each other, indicating that, when they have the option to 
also take money, on average dictators leave the recipient with no gain. 
In the standard dictator game, the recipient is not needy. Many experiments have checked 
how generosity increases if it is made clear that the recipient is deserving. They for instance 
have asked dictators whether they were happy to make a donation to a charity. This has a 
clear and strong effect: meta-regression cons .261***, deserving recipient .115***, N = 445, 
adj.R
2 .075. Figure 4 demonstrates that this can be decomposed into two effects. If the recipi-
ent is deserving, only half as many dictators keep everything. More than 20% give everything. 
The difference in distributions is significant: Epps Singleton, p < .0001.
16  
                                        
16   On methodology see (Epps and Singleton 1986; Goerg and Kaiser 2009). The test is preferred over Kol-
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Giving to a Deserving Recipient 
 
Dictators do take even less if the recipient had earned the money into which they are now free 
to tap: meta-regression, cons .286***, recipient earned money -.059, takeoption -.084, 
earned*takeoption .616
+, N = 445, adj.R
2 .008. 
The standard dictator game is a zero sum game. One dollar won for the recipient is one dollar 
lost for the dictator. Quite a few experiments have turned the game into a positive sum game. 
They for instance have stipulated that one dollar lost for the dictator increases the recipient's 
payoff by three dollars. Other experiments have reduced the efficiency of giving, so that one 
dollar lost for the dictator creates less than a dollar for the recipient. These manipulations 
have a significant effect in the expected direction. The larger the multiplier, the more dictators 
give, and vice versa: meta-regression, cons .248***, multiplier (fraction or multiple of 1) 
.030*, N = 445, adj.R
2 .016. 
What if there is more than one recipient? One might have thought that the presence of a se-
cond recipient serves as an excuse for giving little to both. Actually, the opposite is true. If 
there is another recipient, both receive substantially more: meta-regression, cons .280***, 
multiple recipients .112*, N = 445, adj.R
2 .022. 
In the standard dictator game, the recipient is poor while the dictator is rich. If the recipient 
also receives an endowment upfront (as, for instance, in Eckel, Grossman et al. 2005), this 
strongly reduces giving: meta-regression cons .291***, recipient endowment -.213***, N = 
445, adj.R
2 .052. As Figure 5 shows, if the recipient has received a positive endowment at the 
start of the interaction, the reduction is almost perfectly proportional to the size of the en-




















Effect of Upfront Endowment to Recipient 
 
Perceived distributive fairness is also altered if the pie is not manna from heaven, but if the 
dictator had to earn it. This strongly reduces her generosity: meta-regression, cons .295***, 
earned pie -.169***, N = 445, adj.R
2 .084. The mere fact that the dictator is ostentatiously 
entitled with the pie does not have a significant effect in meta-regression. With original data, 
and controlling for study heterogeneity, there is a small, weakly significant effect in the ex-
pected direction: cons .342***, entitlement -.098
+, additional adj.R
2 <.001.  
d) Framing 
The standard dictator game is presented as a context free opportunity structure, giving the dic-
tator all the decision power, and the recipient none. Experimenters have added a variety of 
frames to the dictator game, like buying and selling a commodity (Hoffman, McCabe et al. 
1994). Individual frames can be quite influential (see e.g. Branas-Garza 2007). Yet the ab-
stract fact that a frame has been added does not have a significant effect; each frame is differ-
ent. Another manipulation that is related to framing has a remarkably strong effect though. If 
dictators handle coins or notes, they give substantially more: meta-regression, cons .268***, 
real money .075***, N = 445, adj.R
2 .023. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the effect has two 
sources. If they handle real money, participants are less likely to give nothing. More remarka-
bly even, they become much more likely to give everything. The difference in distributions is 
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Effect of Handling Real Money 
e) Social  Distance 
In the standard dictator game, it is common knowledge that the dictator and the recipient are 
randomly selected members of the same student subject pool. Experimenters have manipulat-
ed the degree of social distance, ranging from a total stranger over another member of the sub-
ject pool to a member of a more closely defined group, to the friend of a friend of a friend, to 
the friend of a friend, to an immediate friend (this has been an active area of research recently, 
see Leider, Möbius et al. 2009; Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes et al. 2010; Goeree, McConnell et 
al. 2010).
17 In the meta-regression, the degree of social distance has a surprising negative ef-
fect. The model predicts that dictators give the less the closer the recipient: meta-regression, 
cons .355***, degree of social distance -.063***, N = 445, adj.R
2 .098. Inspecting Figure 7, 
one should become suspicious though. If dictators and recipients are any closer than being 
members of the same subject pool, their generosity is practically stable. The significant effect 
is a statistical artefact, driven by other explanatory factors inducing ordinary members of the 
subject pools to contribute substantially more. This of course strongly indicates that multiple 
regression is preferable over single regression.
18 
                                        
17   Note that social distance measures proximity, not distributive concerns. If, for instance, dictators are in-
vited to give to a charity, social distance is high, but there is a higher than ordinary social expectation of 
giving. 
18   If one controls for unobserved heterogeneity, in multiple regression one recovers the positive effect of 
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Effect of Social Distance 
 
f) Demographics 
The normal participant of a dictator game is a student. On average, non-students give much 
more: meta-regression, cons .398***, student -.151***, N = 445, adj.R
2 .153. As Figure 8 
shows, students are much more likely to give nothing, and they are much less likely to choose 
the equal split, or to even give everything. The difference in distributions is statistically sig-
nificant: Epps Singleton, p < .0001. These are remarkable findings. Experimental economists 
have often been critized for generating artificial findings with a subject pool that has little to 
do with the much harsher reality of economic relations (see e.g. Levitt and List 2007). At least 
in dictator games, the opposite turns out to be true. Student experiments underestimate the 





















Comparing Students to Non-Students 
                                        
19   Note, however, that the effect reverses in model 3 of Table 1, i.e. when controlling for other explanatory 
factors and for unobserved heterogeneity by way of treatment dummies.   17
Starting with (Eckel and Grossman 1998), many have tested gender effects. Since in ordinary 
papers on dictator games gender is not reported, meta-regression with all data would not be 
meaningful. If one confines the sample to those papers that have explicitly tested gender, it 
turns out that women give significantly more: meta-regression, cons .212***, female .058*, N 
= 12, adj.R
2 .106.  
If one does the same with dictator race, there is no significant effect. For this independent var-
iable, meta-regression is the only option since no paper that has manipulated dictator race has 
also reported distributions. 
Women do not only give more in dictator games, they also get more as recipients. In a meta-
regression confined to those experiments that have explicitly tested recipient gender, this fac-
tor alone explains 73.2 %  of the observed variance, cons .052, female recipient .150***, N = 
39. If one controls for recipient gender, dictator gender is insignificant, cons .041, female dic-
tator .016, female recipient .143*, N = 33, adj. R
2 .7203. Recipient race does not have a sig-
nificant effect. 
Anthropologists have frequently used the dictator game as a technology for quantifying the 
sociability of developing or primal cultures (the classic study is Henrich and Boyd 2005). If 
one codes Western subject pools as 0, pools from developing countries as 1, and pools from 
primal societies as 2, one establishes a remarkable significant positive effect: meta-regression, 
cons .275***, society characteristic .053**, N = 445, adj.R
2 .024. The more a society is pri-
mal, the more dictators are willing to share. If one treats the two non-Western origins as cate-
gorical variables, seemingly the difference between Western and developing countries disap-
pears, while the difference between developed and primal societies is all the stronger: meta-




Figure 9 demonstrates, this impression is misleading. In Western societies, the typical picture 
from student populations is replicated. Close to 40 % of participants give nothing, less than 20 
% choose the equal split, some 5 % give everything. Both in developing countries and in pri-
mal societies, giving more than 50% is rare. However, in primal societies the equal split is the 
mode, and giving little is rare. Developing countries are in the middle. Giving nothing is 
much less frequent than in Western societies, but much more frequent than in primal societies. 
Contribution patterns basically distribute over the range [0, .5]. All bilateral comparisons of 



























Society of Origin 
 
Age also has a strong effect. If one codes children with 0, students with 1, middle-aged adults 
with 2, and the elderly with 3, there is a highly significant, substantial effect: meta-regression, 
cons .187***, age .098***, N = 445, adj.R
2 .038. If one treats each age class as a categorical 
variable, in meta-regression, the behaviour of children is not significantly different from the 
behaviour of students, while there is a significant difference with respect to the remaining age 
classes: meta-regression, cons .269***, child .036, middle age .138**, elderly .443***, N = 
445, adj.R
2 .122. Again distributions are more informative than means. Children are unlikely 
to give more than half of the pie, and many give less. This explains why there is no difference 
in means, compared to students. Yet children are much less likely to give nothing. Giving 
nothing is even rarer in participants of middle age, and it never happens in the elderly. For 
people of middle age, the equal split is the mode, while for the elderly this is giving every-
thing. All bilateral comparisons of distributions are statistically significant: Epps Singleton, 
p < .0001. 
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Effect of Age 
 
5. Multiple  Regression 
In single regression most effects turns out significant. Yet single regression has little explana-
tory power. This becomes patent through the measure for the adjusted R
2. In most regressions, 
it is below .1, implying that more than 90 % of the variance remains unexplained. Compared 
to the meta-analysis of means, which left 97.1 % of the variance unexplained, this is only a 
marginal improvement. Multiple regression has a considerably better fit. Table 1 uses comple-
mentary analytic strategies. The complete meta-regression model, i.e. the regression with 
weighted study means as the dependent variable, explains almost half of the variance, even if 
one adjusts the R
2 for the fact that one uses 24 explanatory variables.
20 
 
                                        
20   In these regressions three explanatory variables are left out since including them would severely reduce 







dummies tobit logit  0 
truncated
ols  logit 50  logit 100
limited action space  -0.062+ 0.038 -0.029 0.027 0.281 0.131** -1.093** 0.05
degree of uncertainty  -0.036 -0.07 -0.654*** -0.068 0.303 -0.2 0.584 0
incentive -0.01 -0.040** -0.052** -0.067*** 0.418** -0.004 -0.305* -0.142
repeated game  -0.064** -0.018 -0.130* -0.024 0.037 -0.025 -0.566*** 0.409
group decision  -0.054+ -0.108* -0.015 -0.103+  -0.07 -0.210*** -0.097 0
identification 0.042 0.049* 0.243*** 0.077* -0.522* 0.035 0.575** 0.016
social cue  0.005 -0.031 0.225*** -0.033 -0.026 -0.06 0.062 -0.343
concealment -0.065* -0.028 -0.123*** -0.035 0.083 -0.032 -0.147 -0.14
double blind  -0.024 -0.021 -0.262*** -0.023  0 -0.028 0.185 -0.447
take option  0.067 -0.037 -0.038 -0.083 0.443 0.043 0.371 0.125
deserving recipient  0.086*** 0.168*** 0.534*** 0.226*** -0.913*** 0.117* -0.520* 1.830***
recipient earned  0.128* 0.169*** -0.132* 0.275*** -0.922** 0.220*** 1.006*** 0.866
efficiency recipient  0.026+ 0.007 -0.180*** 0.022 -0.294** -0.026 -0.394* 0.875**
multiple recipients  0.148*** 0.038* -0.065+ 0.028 0.187* 0.125*** -0.611*** 0.539+
recipient endowment  -0.173*** -0.058 0.204** -0.147 0.886* 0.062 -0.795+ 0.248
dictator earned  -0.174*** -0.191*** -0.126** -0.374*** 1.489*** -0.213*** -1.556*** 0
real money  0.025 0.062+ 0.216*** 0.076+  -0.141 0.092+ -0.443* 2.058***
degree of social proximity -0.053*** 0.002 0.191*** 0.005 0.036 0.017 -0.832** 2.675***
student -0.104** -0.220*** 0.216*** -0.233*** 0.456 -0.301*** -0.076 -2.185***
child -0.117** -0.195** -0.007 -0.172* -0.311 -0.385*** 0.932+ -6.404***
middle age  0.001 -0.044 0.435*** 0.031 -1.475+ -0.258*** 1.888** -2.434***
old age  0.336*** 0.189** 0.181+ 0.247**  0 0 1.293* -1.384*
developing country  0.015 0.01 0.231*** 0.042 -0.617* -0.052+ 0.211 -1.329*
primal society  -0.009 -0.098 -0.047 -0.027 -1.847* -0.329*** 0.492 -4.147***
constant 0.416*** 0.518*** 0.210* 0.460*** -1.377+ 0.651*** 0.556 -5.241***
N 603 20813 20813 20813  20663 13298 20813 19402
adj.R
2 / pseudo R




codes are explained in section 4  21
In meta-regression, not all regressors turn out significant. The degree of uncertainty is insignifi-
cant, as is the kind of incentives, dictator identification, the presence of a social cue, dictator-
experimenter anonymity, a take option, the use of real money, the fact that the dictator has mid-
dle age, and that she comes from a developing country or from a primal society. Figure 11 col-
lects those regressors that remain at least marginally significant if one controls for all other ex-
planatory variables. Old age has by far the strongest positive effect. A fairly strong effect also 
stems from having more than one recipient. The remaining three positive variables concern dif-
ferent dimensions of recipient need and legitimacy. By contrast, if the recipient’s desire is only 
weakly legitimate, this strongly reduces giving. This may result from the fact that the recipient 
had an endowment in the first place, or that the dictator had to earn the pie. In demographic 
terms, children and students give less. Dictators also exploit concealment options. Finally they 
give less if the game is repeated, if the action space is limited, if groups decide and, surprisingly, 
the smaller the social distance to the recipient. 
 
Figure 11 
Significant Regressors in the Complete Model 
meta-regression 
 
If one replaces study means by the original data (column 2 of Table 1), one works with 20,813 
instead of 445 datapoints. One should expect that this makes it easier to establish significance; 
standard errors are the standard deviation, divided by the square root of N, after all. This indeed 
holds for dictator identification and for the use of real coins and notes. Both now also have their 
positive effect if one controls for all the other explanatory variables. Interestingly, when control-
ling for alternative explanations the effect of incentivising individual choices turns out negative; 
dictators give less. The equally negative effect of group decision is now significant at conven-
tional levels. Two more regressors become significant at a more demanding level. Yet there are 
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using individual choices. Two more regressors are only significant at a lower level. Yet if one 
reduces the sample of the meta-regression to those studies that reported distribution information, 
one finds the same or even lower significance levels. The differences are thus due to sample at-
trition. As usual, working with individual rather than aggregate data leads to considerably more 
unexplained variance; means tend to exhibit greater regularity. 
Model 3 also works with the original data, but adds treatment dummies to the model. This has an 
advantage and a disadvantage. Any unexplained heterogeneity across studies is “dummied out”. 
This yields many more significant regressors. Participants give less the higher the uncertainty. 
They give more if there is a social cue. They give less when double blind procedures are used. 
They give more if they handle real money, when they have middle age or when they come from 
a developing country. All of this is as expected. It is interesting that, in this specification, stu-
dents give substantially more. It is comforting that, in this model, a higher degree of social prox-
imity has the expected positive sign (not a negative one, as in meta-regression). Yet other regres-
sors are surprising. The negative effect of being a child is no longer significant, nor is the 
positive effect of old age. Higher efficiency for the recipient has a counterintuitive negative ef-
fect, and the fact that the recipient already holds an endowment has an equally counterintuitive 
positive effect. All these surprising effects result from the fact that almost all the variance with 
respect to these explanatory variables results from variance between, not within treatments. 
Therefore in this specification the effects picked up by both meta-regression and OLS without 
treatment fixed effects go into the treatment dummies. For the explanatory variables no variance 
is left, or it comes from a few outliers. Consequently eventually both specifications of the OLS 
model should be seen as complementary, not as mutually exclusive. 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, a fairly substantial fraction of dictators maximises individual money 
earnings and gives zero. One may therefore wonder whether OLS is the appropriate functional 
form. One may instead consider the individual data to be left censored. The standard treatment of 
censored data is a Tobit model. It assumes that there are dictators who would have given a nega-
tive amount, had they not been prevented from this by experimental design. As the experiments 
demonstrate that give participants a take option, this assumption is tenable. If they have a take 
option, quite a few participants seize it. This even holds if they can both give and take (Bardsley 
2008). In the Tobit model, significance levels look very similar to OLS (without treatment dum-
mies). However, a number of coefficients become substantially larger.
21 This in particular holds 
for the fact that the recipient is deserving, and that she or the dictator earned the pie. Also the 
effect of old age becomes more pronounced. 
An equally plausible analytic approach assumes that the decision to make a positive contribution, 
and the decision how much to give, conditional on the willingness to give at all, are two separate 
processes. Then, a hurdle model is appropriate. It first analyses the binary decision to give or not 
to give with a logit model. For the size of positive contributions, conditional on giving anything, 
                                        
21   To allow for direct comparisons with the OLS model, the Tobit model reports marginal effects, not the coef-
ficients of the latent variable.    23
it uses OLS, adjusting the distribution assumption to the fact that observations are taken from a 
truncated normal distribution (for background see McDowell 2003).
22  
From this exercise, one learns that the willingness to give anything is indeed not driven by the 
same forces as the choice of the size of the contribution to the recipient. Let us first compare the 
logit component with the least squares model of all data. One now finds a strongly significant 
effect of the factor by which dictator generosity translates into recipient benefit. The larger this 
factor, i.e. the higher the efficiency of a dollar given, the less likely a dictator is to give nothing. 
Conversely, the larger the upfront endowment of the recipient, the more a dictator is inclined to 
keep everything. In this model, one also reestablishes the difference between Western and devel-
oping countries or primal societies. In developing countries, dictators are less likely to give noth-
ing. In primal societies this is extremely unlikely. Finally there is a fairly pronounced, although 
only weakly significant negative effect of middle age. 
For the truncated least squares model, two comparisons are of interest: with unconditional least 
squares, and with the logit model. The first comparison reveals that dictator-experimenter ano-
nymity significantly reduces the willingness to give, as does middle age and being a member of a 
primal society, while a limited action space increases conditional giving; none of these four ef-
fects was significant in the unconditional model. For another four regressors, the significance 
level goes up, compared to the unconditional model. This holds true for the negative effect of 
group decision and of being a child, and for the positive effect of the recipient having earned her 
endowment, and of the dictator being faced with multiple recipients.  
Interestingly, in the very same respects truncated OLS also differs from the hurdle equation. The 
logit model is either insignificant in these respects, or it has a lower level of significance. This 
suggests that the hurdle model indeed outperforms OLS. Apparently, the decision to give nothing 
is indeed driven by forces that differ from the conditional choice of a contribution level. Three 
regressors only matter for the conditional choice, not for the willingness to give at all. Students 
and groups make smaller contributions. If dictators handle real coins and notes, this slightly in-
creases their contributions, conditional on their willingness to give. By contrast, a number of ex-
planatory factors only matter for the willingness to give anything, not for the size of the contribu-
tion. This holds for the question whether each and every choice is paid out, for the factor by 
which a dollar given translates into a dollar received, for the question whether the recipient has 
her own endowment, and whether the dictator comes from a developing country. Actually, no 
more than three regressors significantly explain both the willingness to make a positive contribu-
tion and its size. If the recipient has earned the pie, she is more likely to get something, and the 
size of the contribution increases. Interestingly, the remaining two regressors that are significant 
in both models predict conflicting effects. Being of middle age and being a member of a primal 
society reduces the likelihood of giving nothing, but it also reduces the size of contributions. 
Such dictators think they should give something, but they give rather little. 
                                        
22   The number of observations is, of course, confined to those participants who have made a positive contribu-
tion.   24
While giving nothing is the mode, the distribution of dictator giving may also be described as tri-
modal, with the equal split and giving everything as the two other peaks. This invites two more 
logit models. The first tests the hypothesis that a dictator goes for the equal split, against the nul 
that she makes another decision. This model too is revealing. The equal split is most popular in 
middle age and in primal societies. If the recipient identifies the dictator, this also pushes the 
dictator towards the equal split. By contrast, if the game is repeated, or if there are multiple re-
cipients, the equal split becomes considerably less likely. 
The final logit model tests the hypothesis that the dictator gives everything, against the nul that 
she makes a different choice.
23 The strongest force pulling dictators into this direction is social 
proximity. Handling real coins and notes and knowing that the recipient is deserving also make 
total generosity much more likely. If a dollar given is worth more to the recipient, this also 
makes it more likely that the dictator gives all. By contrast, the elderly, dictators from develop-
ing countries and students are quite unlikely to donate the entire pie. This is extremely unlikely 
in middle aged dictators, in members of primal societies, and in children. Note that this final 
model explains a larger fraction of the variance than any other model working with the original 
data. 
Table 2 summarises the evidence. In this table, if a cell is empty, the respective regressor does 
not have a significant effect. + signs indicate a significant positive effect, – signs indicate a sig-
nificant negative effect. If either meta-regression or least squares at the level of individual data 
demonstrates a positive effect, one should expect less dictators to give nothing. This expectation 
is borne out for deserving recipients and for recipients who have earned their endowment. By the 
same logic, dictators who have earned the pie give less and are more likely to give nothing. One 
has a similar picture if dictators handle real coins and notes and if each individual choice is paid, 
although here the overall effect is insignificant in meta-regression. The logic is violated by the 
effect of deciding for multiple recipients. The overall effect is positive. Nonetheless, dictators are 
more likely to give nothing. Yet they are also more likely to give everything. This manipulation 
thus polarises choices. 
Being a student, being a child or deciding as a group have a significant overall effect, but do not 
significantly influence the decision to make a positive contribution. If the action space is limited, 
the game is repeated, the dictator can conceal her action, social proximity is different from being 
a member of the same subject pool or if the recipient has a positive endowment, this explains 
differences in study means, but it does not explain individual choices (in the reduced sample). 
Having middle age, being a member of a primal society or of a developing country or providing 
dictator-experimenter anonymity does not explain overall effects. Yet these regressors become 
significant if one separately analyses the decision to make a positive contribution, and its size. 
Manipulating the degree of uncertainty, providing the dictator with a social cue, or giving her a 
take option does not have a significant effect once one controls for the other explanatory factors. 
 
                                        







dummies tobit logit 0 truncols  logit 50  logit 100
deserving recipient  + + +  +  –  +  –  + 
recipient earned  + + –  +  –  +  +   
old age  + + +  +      +  – 
multiple recipients  + + –    +  +  –  + 
real money   +  +  +    +    + 
identification   +  +  +  –    +   
efficiency recipient  +  –    –    –  + 
dictator earned  – – –  –  +  –  –   
student  – – +  –    –    
child  – –    –    –  +  – 
group decision  – –    –    –    
incentive   –  –  –  +       
limited action space  –        – –   
repeated game  –  –        –   
concealment  –  –           
degree of social proximity  –  +        –  + 
recipient endowment  –  +    +       
middle age     +    –  –  +  – 
primal society        –  –    – 
developing country     +    –      – 
double blind     –           
degree of uncertainty     –           
social cue     +           
take option               
constant  + + +  +  –  +    – 
 
Table 2 
Significant Effects in Multiple Regression 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main substantive results of this study can be read off Table 2 and Figure 11. The more con-
sistent effects are across specifications of the statistical model (Table 2), the more firmly an ef-
fect is established. The following effects are very robust: If the recipient is deserving, she gets 
more. If the dictator has old age, she gives more. If the dictator is identified, she is more gener-
ous. Children give less, as do groups. Other effects only show up when means are replaced by 
distributions. If one does, one finds that dictators give more when handling real money, and 
when they are identified. If choices are incentivized, this reduces generosity. Yet other effects 
only become visible if one further controls for unobserved heterogeneity. One then finds that 
dictators give more when they get a social cue, when they are middle aged (rather than being a 
student), or when they come from a developing country. Further effects were already visible in 
meta-regression, but become apparent in the original data only when controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity. One then finds that dictators give less if the game is repeated, and if they have a 
concealment option.    26
For some effects, it is important to separately analyse the decision to give anything, and the 
amount given, conditional on passing the hurdle. One then for instance better understands the 
effect of identification. If dictators cannot hide behind anonymity, they feel urged to give some-
thing; they do not feel obliged to give more. The same holds if a dollar given is multiplied before 
it reaches the recipient. If dictators had to earn the pie, they are significantly more likely to keep 
everything. The same holds, once their choices are incentivized and if the recipient also has an 
endowment. Middle aged dictators, and those from developing countries or primal societies are 
significantly less likely to keep their entire endowments.  
Effect sizes are visualized in Figure 11. By far the biggest effect is demographic. Pensioneers 
give more than 30 % more than average, children give more than 10 % less. Next in line are dis-
tributional concerns. If the dictator had to earn the pie, or if the recipient has her own endow-
ment, generosity drops by almost 20 %. By contrast, the recipient keeps more than 10 % more if 
she had to earn the pie, and she receives some 8 % more if she is visibly deserving. Situational 
features have smaller effects. If there are multiple recipients, generosity goes up by more than 
10 %. If the game is repeated, if the action space is limited, or if groups decide, generosity goes 
down by less than 10 %.  
The picture is thus complicated. There is, of course, also a simple message. Originally, Daniel 
Kahneman and his co-authors had invented the dictator game to refute the income maximisation 
assumption of economics textbooks. If one translates the assumption into the categorical hypoth-
esis that all humans maximise income, their first experiment was sufficient to falsify the hypoth-
esis. After 25 years of experimentation, the original result has not been refuted. Actually, in the 
sample of those experiments that provide distribution information, the probability of giving a 
positive amount, and hence violating the income maximisation hypothesis, comes close to the 
original result. In Kahneman’s experiment, 74 % did not seize the option to gain an additional 
dollar. In later dictator game experiments, 63.89 % of all participants, i.e. 13,298 of 20,813 dicta-
tors, made a positive contribution. 
Yet if this was everything one wanted to test, 129 experiments would certainly have been an 
overkill. The research question becomes richer, and more meaningful for understanding social 
interaction, if one turns the finding upside down. While 63.89 % violate the income maximisa-
tion hypothesis, 36.11 % do not. Hence more than a third of a typical population does indeed 
consist of subjects who have no reticence to leave a recipient with nothing, although this recipi-
ent is at their mercy. Clearly, generosity is not a human universal. Moreover, those who are will-
ing to make a donation do neither give everything, nor do they split the pie equally. On average, 
they give 42.64 %. Hence even those who in principle are generous to a degree exploit the op-
portunity to their advantage. Even generous subjects thus tend to have a selfish side. 
Consequently, the ample evidence on dictator games is better read as an exercise in exploring 
human heterogeneity. The radically simple design of the game makes it a powerful tool for the 
systematic variation of conditions that moderate sociality. As differential psychology, using dif-
ferent experimental approaches, has established long ago (Ross and Nisbett 1991), (perceived)   27
situation and personality interact. In and of themselves, neither situational nor personality varia-
bles suffice to predict behaviour. One must understand how a person with a certain personality 
trait reacts to the situation, as she perceives it. Dictator games are helpful for exploring human 
sociality, because the situation can be tightly controlled, because the simple game can be played 
with all classes of participants and, of course, because decisions are incentivised. 
Ironically, the radically simple dictator game provides ample evidence that human sociality is far 
from simple. The existing evidence is best compared with a map. After 25 years of expeditions 
into human sociality, some major roads have been safely documented. Yet aside those roads, 
there are still many white spots. It is therefore safe to predict that dictator game experimentation 
will continue to thrive. To date, it is an open question though whether experimenters will ever be 
able to draw a near complete map of sociality. It is even less clear whether those relying on this 
knowledge in the interest of improving their individual well-being or of making better policy 
will be able to correctly infer where an interaction partner is located in this landscape. The better 
the driving forces of human behaviour are understood, the more it becomes obvious that institu-
tions are not only needed for overcoming antisocial motives. They are at least as important for 
making behaviour predictable (Engel 2005).   28
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Appendix 2: Descriptives 
 
limited action space  unlimited  several options  two options     
 414  19581  29  1184  2  48     
degree of uncertainty  0  0.25  0.5  0.75 
 438  20615  3  87  2  56  2  55 
incentive  no  random payment  each choice paid     
 9  241  115  3225  321  17347     
repeated one  shot  repeated         
 381  11756  64  9057         
group decision  no  group involvement group decision     
 436  20315  5  426  4  72     
identification no  yes         
 393  20069  52  744         
social cue  no  yes         
 423  19849  22  964         
concealment no  optional  mandatory     
 426  19773  17  1006  2  34     
doubleblind singleblind  doubleblind         
 327  16720  118  4093         
takeoption no  yes         
 440  20605  5  208         
deserving recipient  ordinary  deserving         
 376  18252  69  2561         
recipient earned  no  yes         
 430  20273  15  540         
efficiency recipient  0.33  0.5  1  1.25 
 7  0  8  302  372  19580  4  0 
 1.33  1.5  2  3 
 8  0  2  0  18  431  26  500 
multiple recipients  single recipient multiple         
 433  17002  12  3811         
recipient endowment  0  0.1  0.25  0.33 
 420  19852  3  116  5  175  2  0 
 0.363  0.5  0.66  0.75 
 2  202  3  200  2  0  1  27 
dictator earned  no  yes         
 421  20098  24  715         
real money  no  yes         
 349  18023  96  2790         
degree of social distance foreign group  unspecified  same group     
 12  198  409  20273  15  342     
  friends (3)  friend of friend  friend     
 3  0  3  0  3  0     
student yes  no         
 351  18229  94  2584         
age  child  student age  middle age  old age 
 25  513  401  19720  10  430  9  150 
development of country  Western developing  primitive     
 389  19280  17  590  39  943     
 
left hand column: frequency in meta-study; right hand column: frequency in reconstructed original data 